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abstract
Among the most pressing philosophical questions occupying those 
interested in the ethics of the family is why should parents, as opposed to 
charity workers or state officials, raise children? In their recent Family 
Values, Brighouse and Swift have further articulated and strengthen their 
own justification of the parent-child relationship by appealing to its crucial 
role in enabling the child’s proper development and in allowing parents to 
play a valuable fiduciary role in the lives of children. In this paper, I argue 
that the set of interests Brighouse and Swift identify as necessary for the 
justification of the family fails to account for the different stages and the 
different cultural settings that mark the parent-child relationship. 
In particular, I ague that their justification of the family fails to satisfy 
the following two desiderata: (i) that the justification for the parent-child 
relationship should ideally track the good-making feature(s) of the 
relationship that extend across its entire history, and (ii) such justification 
should ideally explain what is valuable about the parent-child relationship 
in both liberal and non-liberal family contexts. In light of my critique, I 
sketch an alternative account of family values, one that appeals directly to 
the special mode of caring we see in the parent-child relationship, a form 
of caring that is certainly present in non-liberal societies and that typically 
extends across a lifetime.
Keywords: family, children, parents, paternalism, autonomy, love, Brighouse, 
Swift
“Ser mãe é padecer no paraíso”2
1 A previous version of this paper was presented in the Department of Law in Pompeu 
Fabra University in Barcelona, where I received extremely helpful feedback. I am especially 
grateful to Pablo de Lora, Serena Olsaretti, Andrew Williams and an anonymous referee for 
this journal. I also would like to thank Ryan Cox and Eric Schliesser for helpful discussions 
on the topic.
2  Popular Brazilian Expression: “Being a mother is like suffering in paradise” (My 
translation from Portuguese). 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Among the most challenging philosophical questions concerning the 
ethics of the family is why parents, rather than charity workers, or state 
officials, say, should raise children. What justifies the family as the best 
arrangement for the rearing of citizens who are not yet in a position to 
secure their own current and future interests?
One answer to this question is that the parent-child relationship is 
justified by some fundamental interest that adults have with regard to their 
biological children, such as the interest in the product of their gestational 
labor or genetic investment.3 Another approach to this question starts from 
the assumption that children are extremely vulnerable and dependent and 
that their interests should exhaust any theory attempting to justify what is, 
at its core, a coercive, and therefore morally suspect, type of intimate 
relationship.4 This child centred view of family relationships is based on the 
contention that the parent-child relationship can only be justified on the 
assumption that no other social arrangement could do a better job at securing 
the core interests of children. Were this empirical assumption to become 
unsustainable, adults would cease to have a prima facie right to parent.
An alternative to both these views is the “dual-interest” account of child 
rearing.5 Those articulating this position have appealed to both the interests 
of children in being raised by parents and the interests of parents in raising 
children. The fundamental commitment of the dual-interest view is that the 
interests on both sides have to be balanced out and that good enough parents 
retain their right to parent even if it turns out that other social arrangements 
would do a better job at protecting and promoting the interests of children. 
Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift have recently further articulated and 
strengthened their own version of the dual interest account by defending the 
position that the parent-child relationship is justified by its crucial role in 
securing the child’s proper development and in enabling the flourishing of 
many adults (Brighouse and Swift 2014).6
In this essay, I argue that the specific set of interests Brighouse and Swift 
identify as grounds for the justification of the parent-child relationship fail 
to account for the different stages and the different cultural settings that 
mark the family. In particular, I argue that their account of family values 
3 For a genetic account, see Hall (1999). For a gestational account, see Narayan (1999).
4 The coercive aspect of the relationship here is a result of the fact that due to the 
lack of a sufficient degree of autonomy, children cannot typically consent to partaking in the 
relationship. For child-centred views, see Blustein (1982); Vallentyne (2003).
5 See Brighouse and Swift (2006); Clayton (2006); MacLeod (2010); Gheaus (2012). 
6 See also Rawls (1999: 265).
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fails to satisfy the following two desiderata: (i) that the justification for the 
parent-child relationship should ideally track the good-making feature(s) 
of the relationship that extend across its entire history, and (ii) such 
justification should ideally explain what is valuable about the parent-child 
relationship in both liberal and non-liberal family contexts. In light of my 
critique, I sketch an alternative account of what is special about the family, 
one that appeals directly to the special mode of caring we see in the parent-
child relationship, a form of caring that is certainly present in non-liberal 
families and that typically extends across a lifetime. 
The discussion will be structured as follows. In section 2, I brief ly 
rehearse Brighouse and Swift’s arguments for their dual-interest account of 
child rearing. In section 3, I motivate two desiderata for a successful theory 
of what justifies the parent-child relationship and argue that Brighouse and 
Swift’s account, as it stands, cannot meet them. In sections 4 and 5, I sketch 
an alternative justification for the parent-child relationship that overcomes 
the challenges raised in the previous section, and briefly discuss some of its 
implications.
2. BRIGHOUSE AND SWIFT ON FAMILY VALUES
Let us start our inquiry by briefly rehearsing Brighouse and Swift’s argument 
in favor of taking the family to be the best institutional setting for the rearing 
of children.7 According to the authors, there are a number of interests on 
the part of children that ground their right to be raised by at least one parent.8 
First, children are highly dependent on adults for their most basic emotional 
and biological needs. Second, children are profoundly vulnerable to the quality 
of other people’s decisions, and the sort of paternalistic treatment they are 
subjected to in childhood can significantly impact how well their lives go 
as a whole. Third, children are capable of eventually developing a capacity 
for autonomy and so are significantly different from other vulnerable 
individuals who will never become capable of attending to their own 
interests. Brighouse and Swift believe that, when taken together, these 
interests give children an overarching interest to be ‘manipulated’ and 
‘coerced’ into doing what is good for them, or what will prepare them for 
becoming autonomous later on in their lives (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 62-70).
7 Like Brighouse and Swift (2014: XI), I will employ the concept of “the family” to refer 
to the parent-child relationship in the context of this discussion. Note that I do not take a stand 
on whether or not other intimate relationships should also be picked out by this concept. 
8 For Brighouse and Swift (2014: 53-54), A has a right to X, when A’s interest in doing 
X or having X is weighty enough that it gives rise to a duty on the part of others that they allow 
A to do X or that they provide A with X. Moreover, whether an interest in doing X or having X 
is weighty enough to give rise to a duty on others will depend on the importance of X and the 
costs that come with the provision of X. 
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It is certainly true that children’s lack of autonomy and vulnerability 
makes it appropriate that others act paternalistically towards them, but 
there is still a further question as to why such paternalism should come 
primarily from adults acting within the context of a private and intimate 
family relationship.9 For Brighouse and Swift, the answer lies in the fact 
that such relationships are typically marked by love and that love renders 
the exercise of paternalism more effective (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 71). 
The underlying empirical assumption here is that a loving relationship 
between a child and a competent parent allows the latter to exercise authority 
with knowledge of the former’s unique dispositions, and with the sort of 
spontaneity and care that encourages the child to see the parent as her central 
disciplinary model (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 73). For the authors, the quality 
time which parent and child typically spend together, and the intimacy 
that develops as a result, are so central to the effective exercise of paternalism, 
that there cannot be many of these relationships in a child’s life (Brighouse 
and Swift 2014: 73).10 
If Brighouse and Swift are correct, we now have the beginning of a story 
that purports to explain what is so special about the parent-child relationship:
I. Children need paternalistic treatment to enjoy the goods of childhood 
 and to develop the capacities they need later on in adulthood.
II.  Such paternalistic treatment will be more effective or successful 
 if exercised in a context of an intimate loving relationship.
III. Competent parents can typically exercise paternalism in a context 
 of an intimate loving relationship. 
Conclusion: Children have a basic interest in being cared for by at least 
one, but not too many, competent parents.
So far, so good, but this does not yet give us a dual-interest account. In 
order to explain why it is good for adults to parent children even when 
children could conceivably fare better under alternative arrangements, we 
need to say something about the interest parents have in playing their own 
role in the relationship. For Brighouse and Swift, adults have a strong interest 
in playing the fiduciary role that secures the child’s present and future well-
being. That is, the interest that some adults have in parenting is precisely 
to be in a loving relationship where they can act paternalistically towards 
a child, guaranteeing her basic needs and seeing to it that she develops the 
cognitive, emotional, physical, and moral resources she needs to become 
an autonomous person later on in her life (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 86-90).
9  Brighouse and Swift (2014: 67) write that “paternalism involves manipulating or 
coercing another person with the purpose of serving her good”. 
10  Note that Brighouse and Swift (2014: 70) also recognize that the exercise of paternalism 
should be constrained by the child’s stage of development. 
 Why the Family? 209
LEAP 3 (2015)
Here then is the final justificatory step taken by Brighouse and Swift in 
favor of their dual-interest account of child rearing:
IV. Some competent adults are not only capable of exercising 
 paternalism, but have an interest in playing such a fiduciary role 
 within the context of a loving relationship.11
Conclusion: All children have a strong interest in being cared for by at least one, 
but not many competent parents, and some adults have a strong interest in 
parenting. These interests are sufficiently weighty, and the costs involved in 
securing them are sufficiently reasonable, so as to ground the right of children 
to have at least one parent, and the right of competent adults to parent. The 
balancing of these interests also justifies the family as the best socio-
institutional arrangement for the rearing of children.12
3. TWO DESIDERATA: CONTINUITY AND PLURALISM 
In the previous section, we learnt that for Brighouse and Swift, the need 
for paternalism within the context of a loving relationship ultimately 
grounds the right of children to have at least one parent and that the same 
paternalism grounds a (conditional, limited) right of adults to parent 
children. The aim of this section is to take a step back and think about what 
we want a theory of family values to deliver, as well as evaluate how Brighouse 
and Swift’s dual-interest account fares with regards to such theoretical aims.
To begin with, Brighouse and Swift’s fiduciary account certainly points 
in the right direction by starting with the recognition that children typically 
fare better if they can count on at least one competent adult to actively attend 
to their well being. The account also seems to capture something important 
about how there can be a weighty interest on the part of adults to be in a 
relationship with children that cannot be replaced by other kinds of intimate 
relationships, such as relationship with a pet, or a friend. But do Brighouse 
and Swift really get to the heart of the matter when they point to the interest of 
children in being subjected to this sort of loving paternalism and the interests 
of parents in exercising loving authority as part of the parental role? That 
is, do they succeed in identifying the most basic property or set of properties 
that justify the existence of the family even in a context where other actual 
and conceivable arrangements could do a better job at securing the interests 
of children?
11  As Brighouse and Swift (2014: 86) put it, “[i]t cannot be substituted by other forms of 
relationship, and it contributes to the parent’s well-being so substantially, and in a manner so 
congruent with the interests of children, that it grounds (a conditional, limited) right to parent”. 
12  For the rights theory endorsed by the authors, see supra-note 8.
210 Luara Ferracioli 
LEAP 3 (2015)
In the remainder of this section, I argue that although Brighouse and 
Swift’s fiduciary account helps us make much progress on the ethics of the 
family, it does not, as it stands, meet two important desiderata. First, their 
account fails to explain what is special about the parent-child relationship 
once the child is capable of attending to her own present and future well-
being. It therefore fails to explain what is good or valuable about children 
having parents and parents having children across a lifetime. Let us call 
this the “continuity desideratum”. Second, by arguing that part of what 
justifies the fiduciary role of the parent is its ability to secure the child’s 
future autonomy, their account fails to justify the parent-child relationship 
outside a liberal family context, where parents might lack the disposition 
in seeing to it that their adult child becomes capable of forming and pursuing 
her own conception of the good. Let us call this the “pluralism desideratum”. 
I will discuss each desideratum in turn.
3.1. Continuity
Let me begin by motivating the continuity desideratum, which is that, all 
else being equal, a successful justification for the child-parent relationship 
should also be able to explain why it is good that parents have children and 
children have parents not only during the former’s childhood but also across a 
lifetime. To make sense of this idea, let us imagine a world that is very similar 
to ours but where society has structured procreation and parenting differently, 
and where only elderly members of society become parents and where 
children are conceived and gestated in high-tech government laboratories. 
Let us also imagine that the rationale for this arrangement is efficiency since 
citizens are more productive if they spend their adult lives fully engaged in 
the workforce and then later in life, once they have retired, they will have 
more time to invest in their parental role. Finally, let us assume that quality 
of life and life expectancy are such that children typically have at least one 
sufficiently healthy parent during childhood and adolescence, but typically 
not during their adulthood. 
As becomes clear, this society is one in which both parent’s and children’s 
interests, as identified by Brighouse and Swift, are fully met but where it 
seems that something deeply valuable is lost. What is lost, I take it, is the 
value for both parent and child in enjoying an intimate and loving relationship 
that typically extends across different phases of their lives, and that provides 
the child with the on-going benefit of being subjected to an intense and robust 
mode of caring by the parent (I will defend this claim in more detail in the 
following section). If I am right that the parent-child relationship retains its 
value even when there is no more need for the exercise of paternalism on the 
part of the parent, then we should ideally aim for a justification of the family 
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that does not depend on features that are only present in childhood, but 
that can explain what is valuable about the parent-child relationship as it 
extends across time.13
At this stage, a proponent of Brighouse and Swift’s fiduciary account 
might endorse the continuity desideratum, but deny that the authors fail to 
meet it in their own justification of the family. The response here would be 
to appeal to the fact that Brighouse and Swift also give a lot of weight to the 
role of love in their discussion, and that as a result of love’s continuity, their 
fiduciary account will hold no matter which developmental stage or life 
phase parties find themselves in.
This would indeed be a charitable reading of their discussion, and later 
I sketch an account that does appeals to the role of love in explaining what 
is so special about the parent-child relationship. However, as it stands, it is 
not clear that this interpretation is available to Brighouse and Swift because 
their account of why adults have an interest in parenting appeals to the interest 
that parents have in exercising loving authority over the lives of children. Indeed, 
for Brighouse and Swift, love comes in by playing an important, yet supportive 
role, in the effective exercise of paternalism.14 As they explain:
“The fiduciary aspect remains central. Grandparents, or parent’s friends, or 
nannies, can have close relationships with children, and when they go well, 
those relationships will be conducive to the child’s interests and valuable 
to the adults too. Reading bedtime stories, providing meals, and so on, will 
be contributing to the well-being of both. Still, there’s something distinctively 
valuable about being the person who not only does those things oneself but has 
the responsibility to make sure they get done, sometimes by others, and the 
authority to decide quite how they get done” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 93).
But even if the above passage was somewhat misleading and it was true 
that Brighouse and Swift were primarily interested in love itself, they 
would still need a further argument to justify the interest that adults have 
in parenting given that adults can enjoy relationships of love and intimacy 
with people other than their children. The challenge here is that love per se 
cannot get a dual-interest account off the ground because such an account 
is aimed at explaining what is special about the parent-child relationship 
in particular, not loving relationships more generally.
13 To be sure, as the child goes through different developmental stages, there are 
contingent features of each stage that will provide distinct sources of pleasure to the parent. 
However, it does not follow from this fact that the identity of the relationship changes so 
dramatically that what made it valuable when the child was a toddler is no longer present 
when she is middle-aged.
14 As Brighouse and Swift (2014: 92) put it, “[t]he relationship as a whole, with its 
particular intimate character and the responsibility to play the specific fiduciary role for the 
person with whom one is intimate in that way, is what adults have an interest in”.
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Before I move on to the second desideratum, let me dispel one potential 
concern with the discussion so far. The concern might be that the continuity 
desideratum does not apply to Brighouse and Swift’s fiduciary account because 
theirs is an exercise in political philosophy, not value theory. Perhaps what 
these authors are ultimately interested in doing, so the concern goes, is 
justifying a relationship where one party lacks exit options and is wholly 
dependent on the other party for having her basic interests protected and 
promoted. What motivates the concern here is that the authors might not be 
answering the question of what is valuable about the parent-child relationship 
tout ensemble, but rather explaining why it is permissible for adults to enter and 
maintain intimate relationships with non-consenting children.
One reason why this response is unsatisfactory is that the inability of the 
child to exit a parent-child relationship is not a necessary feature of this sort of 
relationship and that it is possible for there to be intimate relationships where 
the child actually enjoys exit options. These are, for instance, relationships 
where a parent lacks custody rights over the child and decides to give the 
child a lot of space to choose whether or not, and to what extend, to partake 
in the relationship. One might think that the enjoyment of exit options on 
the part of the child dispels the need for justification in such cases, but I 
take it that the degree of intimacy involved at all stages of the relationship, 
and the mere possibility that society could be arranged differently, suffice 
for making the parent-child relationship, at its most general level, proper 
subject of philosophical justification. It would therefore be unsatisfying if 
Brighouse and Swift were solely in the business of explaining why it is 
permissible for there to be relationships between competent parents and 
children where the latter have no prospect of exiting the relationship.
3.2. pluralism
Let me now turn to the second desideratum, which is the claim that a 
successful justification for the parent-child relationship must also be able 
to justify such relationships in non-liberal family contexts. As mentioned 
earlier, Brighouse and Swift believe that one of the reasons children need 
parents is that within the context of an intimate loving relationship, parents 
have an interest to ensure that children acquire the skills they need in order 
to become autonomous later on in their lives. For them, this privileged 
position on the part of parents goes as far as to give parents “a duty to try 
and ensure that the child will become an autonomous agent, someone 
capable of judging, and acting on her judgement, about her own interests” 
(Brighouse and Swift 2014: 90).
Before I explain why this focus on autonomy is problematic for the 
fiduciary account, let me endorse the more general claim that children have 
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a weighty interest in becoming self-determining in adulthood. Let me also 
note that such capacity for autonomy can be cashed out in different ways 
and elsewhere I have argued that children have a weighty interest in 
developing some basic agential skills, such as critical thinking, self-esteem 
and imagination precisely in order to make life choices that sufficiently track 
their own values and aspirations, as opposed to the values and aspirations 
of their parents, community leaders and religious authorities (Ferracioli 
2015).15 I am therefore in deep agreement with Brighouse and Swift in 
thinking that something goes wrong when children fail to acquire the skills 
they need to live adult lives that are genuinely their own.
However, as I see it, Brighouse and Swift are too quick in linking this 
particular interest on the part of children with the fiduciary role of parents. 
That is, they are too quick in assuming that parents are typically capable 
and willing to ensure that their child develop the agential skills needed to 
make their own life choices as opposed to choices that blindly follow 
religious tradition or cultural expectations (Ferracioli and Terlazzo 2014; 
Ferracioli 2015). Indeed, it is a well-known sociological fact that many 
parents in non-liberal cultural contexts do not value autonomy themselves 
and actually want their child to uncritically endorse what they take to be 
deep truths about the world. The result here is that Brighouse and Swift’s 
inclusion of the capacity for autonomy in the list of interests that ground a 
dual-interest account makes it the case that only autonomy-promoting 
parents have a right to parent, because only they have the disposition to 
protect the interest that the child has in becoming autonomous, and so to 
protect one of the interests that, according to the fiduciary account, justify 
the family in the first place. 
Proponents of the fiduciary account might respond by resisting the 
pluralism desideratum, and by arguing that in fact only parents who are 
committed to the development of autonomy have a right to parent because 
only they are genuinely in a position to secure the very weighty interest of 
children in becoming sufficiently self-determining. But this response 
would deny the obvious and morally relevant fact that outside liberal 
family contexts, parents still manage to enjoy a great degree of intimacy, 
love and affection with their children, and that the lives of all parties go 
much better as a result of partaking in such loving relationships.16 Moreover, 
this response also fails to see that the right of children in becoming sufficiently 
15  See also Meyers (1987). 
16  Note that this position is compatible with the claim (which I do not make here) that, 
all else being equal, being raised by liberal parents is superior to being raised by authoritarian 
ones. These are compatible claims because all we need for justifying the parent-child relationship 
is that the relationship meets some sufficiency requirement. Outside the enterprise of justification, 
we can certainly rank styles of parenting according to some independent moral criteria. 
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autonomous can instead correlate with a duty on the part of the state to create 
a neutral system of compulsory public education where children acquire 
the agential skills required for the exercise of autonomy later on in their lives 
(I return to this point later).17
4. PARENTAL LOVE AND THE GOOD LIFE 
In the previous section, I argued that the best candidate for a theory of 
what justifies the family should not appeal solely to features of childhood 
but rather to features of the parent-child relationship that extend across the 
entirety of the relationship. I have also argued that such an account should 
explicitly include the interest of adults in entering into intimate and loving 
relationship with children irrespective of a lack of disposition on their part 
to see to it that their child becomes sufficiently self-determining. In this 
section, I sketch an account that can successfully meet these two desiderata.
So what is this valuable feature that both parents and children have an 
interest in? The answer is actually quite simple: a robust form of caring, or 
what is commonly (but mistakenly) known as “unconditional love”.
To begin with, let me make the obvious point that strictly unconditional 
love is neither feasible nor desirable. It is not feasible because there can be 
psychological limits on the human capacity to love when love is reciprocated 
with physical violence, abuse or complete disregard to one’s well being. 
Even a small child might stop loving a parent when the love she gives is 
reciprocated with extreme forms of violence and abuse. But even if it is 
possible for some people to love unconditionally, it still not something they 
have an interest in doing simply because unconditional love is not on the 
whole desirable. Indeed, it is important for person’s self-respect and self-
esteem that they place certain minimum conditions on the giving of love, 
such as the condition that they be treated with some degree of respect and 
generosity, and that their beloved will, for instance, not offend against the 
most basic demands of morality. The thought here is that even a devoted 
parent should try hard to stop loving an adult child who turns out to be an 
unrepentant mass murderer.
So if unconditional love is neither feasible nor desirable, what kind of love 
do children and parents have an interest in? And what makes this love 
sufficiently distinct from other kinds of love that allows us to get a dual-
interest account off the ground?  The love both children and parents have 
an interest in is parental love, which is of such magnitude and robustness 
that it typically differs from other kinds of love.  
17  For the role of compulsory public education in the fostering of autonomy, see 
Ferracioli and Terlazzo (2014); Ferracioli (2015). 
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Let me start with a rough definition of parental love: a type of love whereby 
the agent cares so much about the good of her beloved, that she is robustly 
disposed to take on a great deal of personal cost in order to advance the good 
of her beloved.
If I am right that parental love can be so defined, then children have an 
interest in being cared for by parents as opposed to charity workers or state 
officials because they have an interest in being at the receiving end of a 
mode of caring that is of significant magnitude and robustness (Ferracioli 
2015). That is, children have an interest in an intimate relationship with an 
adult who cares so much that the child’s life goes well, that she is disposed 
to take on a great deal of costs to advance the child’s interests over the course 
of that relationship. Moreover, children have an interest that such disposition 
on the part of the parent remains robust across time and counter-factual 
worlds.18 A child who enjoys parental love, so this view goes, will continue to 
enjoy it as she becomes older and even if the sacrifices involved become 
extraordinary.
To illustrate the point, we need only think of the hardships we might 
encounter in our adult lives, and the people most likely to continue advancing 
our interests should such hardships arise. If, for instance, we acquired a 
severe illness that made us incapable of attending to our own basic needs, 
or if we became so depressed that we could hardly respond to the world 
around us, the people most likely to continuously advance our interests 
would be our parents, not friends or lovers. 
The same is true of childhood. Charity and orphanage workers might be 
able to adequately meet the basic needs of children under their care, but 
they will not move town or country in order to ensure that a sick child will 
get a special kind of medical treatment.19 They are also unlikely to spend 
all of their discretionary time inventing games and activities so as to 
continuously stimulate a child who suffers from autism spectrum disorder, 
for instance. And in any case, they will certainly not spend their whole lives 
trying to find a child that has disappeared. Charity and orphanage workers 
will of course typically do what morality or their job description require—
the trouble is that, at times, human beings, being the vulnerable creatures 
they are, need much more than that.20 
If I am right that children have an interest in being the recipient of 
parental love so that across a lifetime, they will enjoy a caring relationship 
18  For the notion of a modally demanding value, see Pettit (2008). 
19  For a defence of the claim that children can have all their interests secured in an 
orphanage, see Cowden (2012). 
20  For a more detailed discussion of this claim, see Ferracioli (2014). 
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robustly, then the next question is: why do parents have an interest in 
providing such robust mode of caring? That is, what do parents have to 
gain by being in a relationship where they are disposed to take on so 
much personal cost for the sake of someone else?
As I see it, the interest that parents have in the relationship is precisely to 
enjoy the moral value of loving someone so deeply that one becomes 
significantly disposed to advance her good in ways comparable to the 
advancement of their own good. Indeed, the interest in parenting is nothing 
above and beyond an interest in being in a relationship where one cares so 
deeply about how well someone else’s life goes that one is disposed to take 
on the sort of costs that not even morality can demand from moral agents.21 
This sort of disposition for a deep mode of caring within the context of an 
intimate relationship is a great source of meaning—it enriches the lives of 
adults significantly, despite the fact (or perhaps even partly because) life 
often feels like “suffering in heaven”.
In the previous section, I noted that a general interest in love would not 
get us a dual-interest account off the ground because adults can partake in 
a myriad of loving relationships, such as the relationship one has with a 
friend or lover. And if I am right then, why think that friendships and 
romantic relationships cannot exhibit the sort of robust care we see with 
the parent-child relationship? 
At this stage, it is important to clarify exactly what the shape of the claim 
is. I have not argued that parents necessarily feel parental love. We know all 
too well that some parents do not experience robust modes of caring. I have 
also not argued that other relationships necessarily fail to exhibit the features 
of parental love so far discussed. It is certainly conceivable that some romantic 
relationships and friendships might give rise to equally robust modes of 
caring—it is just that they are significantly less likely to do so. Indeed, 
while it is true that some extraordinary individuals might make all sorts of 
significant sacrifices to advance the good of a friend, friendships are typically 
marked by more reasonable forms of cost-taking and by less robust modes 
of caring. The same is true of romantic relationships. While some people 
would stick with a romantic partner under almost any circumstances, most 
romantic relationships are contingent on many facts remaining true, such 
as shared interests, physical attractiveness, financial stability, loyalty, and 
so and so forth. The modes of love we see in these other loving relationships 
are therefore not typically as robust as parental love. For those adults who 
want to maximize their chance of experiencing robust forms of caring, there 
21  And of course, such disposition for caring needs to be expressed in the context of 
an intimate relationship because the relationship itself provides the necessary conditions 
for effectively acting on the disposition when the need arises.  
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will be an interest in parenting. A strong interest in caring about someone 
else robustly within the context of an intimate relationship then gets us a 
dual-interest off the ground. 
5. DISPERSED AUTHORITY AND THE GOOD OF CHILDREN
In the previous section I sketched an account that meets the two desiderata 
motivated earlier: it captures the vulnerability of childhood but it is not 
exhausted by it. It also makes sense of parent-child relationships in non-
liberal family contexts, where parents might lack the willingness in 
seeing to it that their child becomes sufficiently autonomous but still have 
the disposition to take on a great deal of costs to advance many of her other 
interests. Before concluding, I shall briefly discuss some of the implications 
of justifying the parent-child relationship by appealing to the robust mode 
of caring constitutive of parental love. 
One implication is that a parental love account can leave open how much 
authority parents can legitimately exercise in a context of the parent-child 
relationship. So while Brighouse and Swift vindicated the current model of 
parental authority by arguing that parents had an interest in exercising authority 
over children, the account sketched above would be compatible with a world 
where parents exercised much less authority over children, and where 
governments would exercise much more through the provision of a myriad 
of compulsory public services. For those who worry about growing levels of 
child obesity and the ill effects on children of the anti-vaccination movement, 
for instance, the parental love account comes with the benefit of not giving 
parental authority any justificatory role, and so being much more congenial 
to state interference in areas such as children’s diet and immunization, for 
instance.22 
A second, and related, implication is that a parental love account does 
not make the right to parent conditional on a parents’ ability to foster a 
capacity for autonomy. It therefore endorses the claim that the right of 
children to become autonomous correlate instead with an obligation on the 
part of the state to create a neutral system of compulsory public education 
where children can develop the agential skills required for autonomy without 
being steered towards any particular conception of the good (Ferracioli and 
Terlazzo 2014; Ferracioli 2015). Now, of course, it is true that such an account 
22  Indeed, whilst Brighouse and Swift discussion leads to the odd result that adults 
who do not value autonomy lack the right to parent, a parental love account can recognize 
that their interest in parenting is on a par with the interest of those who do value autonomy, 
while still limiting the ability of all parents to deny their children the opportunity to acquire 
the agential skills required for autonomy.
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would still make the right to parent conditional on the parent not actively 
interfering with the fostering of autonomy by the state, and so there would 
still be a negative duty on the part of the parent not to deny one’s child access 
to public education. The important point to recognize here, however, is that 
there is an important difference between expecting a parent to respect state 
interference in the family via a system of compulsory public education, and 
expecting her to foster herself a capacity she finds detrimental to the pursuit 
of the good life. The latter, but not the former, is simply overly demanding.
A third and final implication of appealing to the value of parental love 
when justifying the family is that such an account is, in principle, more 
liberal with regard to the number of parents a child can potentially have. 
Recall how Brighouse and Swift emphasize that their account can only 
support a small number of parents for each child (at some stage in the 
discussion, they even stipulate that there should be no more than four 
parents in a child’s life (Brighouse and Swift 2014: 71)). As they explain, 
“intimate but authoritative relationships between children and a small 
number of particular adults, relationships in which the adults have 
considerable discretion over the details of how the children are raised, is 
the best arrangement for raising children, taking into account all the 
interests at stake” (Brighouse and Swift 2014: XII). A parental love account, 
on the other hand, allows for more dispersed authority among parties who 
care robustly for a child, and so, in principle, allows for more than four 
parents (but as Brighouse and Swift recognize, the question of which adults 
should parent each child is a separate and independent question (Brighouse 
and Swift 2014: 49)). And in fact, this is already taking place with modern 
family arrangements where children are loved deeply by their parents, 
stepparents, and godparents. Insofar as it is feasible and desirable for the 
child to enjoy a loving relationship with each one of them, it seems odd (if 
not somewhat disrespectful to the child) to artificially limit the size of the 
family just so that each adult can exercise more authority over her life. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this essay I have engaged with the question of “why is it good for children 
to be raised by parents, and good for parents to raise children” (Brighouse 
and Swift 2014: IX). And in particular, I have asked whether Brighouse and 
Swift answer to this question delivers a successful justification of the parent-
child relationship. While I have argued that their account fails on two 
desiderata and that an account in the vicinity might be superior, I believe 
the fiduciary account still stands out for helping us make significant progress 
on the foundational question of what is so special about the family. 
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